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ABSTRACT

Healthcare professionals come to rely upon information systems for patient administration, medication distribution, and the
scheduling of facility resources. The obvious consequence of a lack of reliability in these information systems could result in
the injury or the untimely death of patients. Yet, in the organizational setting, the overall reliability of a system must include
the influence of its people and the culture of the environment. The two most dominant theories surrounding High Reliability
Organizations (HROs) are High Reliability Theory (HRT) and Normal Accident Theory (NAT). Once considered
contradictory, more recent research has shown that they actually complement each other (Perrow, 1999; Weick, 2004). It is
through the lens of these theories that this research seeks to determine the impact of different funding models on reliability in
healthcare systems. The Sullivan-Beach Model (2004) is used to illustrate the impact of the relationships between
component forces of reliability within the Canadian and the United States healthcare systems.
Keywords

High Reliability Organization, High Reliability Theory, Normal Accident Theory, funding models, critical success factors,
complex systems, healthcare systems.
INTRODUCTION

Information systems in the healthcare field are devised to support the reliable delivery of medical services to individuals of
all ages. These information systems may not been seen by the patients. But, healthcare professionals come to rely upon such
information systems as patient administration, medication distribution, and the scheduling of facility resources. The
consequence of a lack of reliability in these information systems could result in the tragic death of a patient or the provision
of inadequate healthcare service to a number of individuals. Thus, it is important that these systems, the people who interact
with them, and the environment within which they operate are not only reliable but that they are highly reliable.
Healthcare information systems in Canada and the United States share a common primary objective: to support the treatment
of patients within the healthcare system. There is, however, one major environmental difference between the healthcare
systems in these two countries. They differ in their approach to funding. In Canada healthcare is publically funded through
the personal income tax system. In the United States, however, healthcare is privately funded through an individual’s
purchase of insurance or the direct payment for a service.
The question emerges, then, and is the focus of this proposed research; “Does the perspective of information system
reliability differ between Canada and the United States in relation to culture or alternative funding models?” This question
will be viewed through the theoretical lens of High Reliability Organizations (HROs) (Sullivan and Beach, 2004).
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. To begin, a theoretical context is presented followed by a
description of HROs. Then, an overview of existing literature is employed to outline the context of a proposed investigation.
The proposed research design is then described. The document concludes with a discussion of expected contributions.
HIGH RELIABILITY THEORY AND NORMAL ACCIDENT THEORY

The two most dominant theories surrounding HROs is High Reliability Theory (HRT) and Normal Accident Theory (NAT).
These theories were once considered contradictory, but research has more recently shown that they actually complement each
other (Perrow, 1999; Weick, 2004).
HRT states risks associated with high hazard environments can be identified and strategies developed to prevent them from
materializing. Further, HRT focuses on the practices within the organization and the positive effects of a reliabilityconscious culture (Tamuz and Harrison, 2006). HROs are known for placing higher priority on reliability than anything else,
including efficiency. This is especially true where unreliability has a direct and adverse affect on safety (Roberts and Bea,
2001). HRT also incorporates mechanisms where the organization can learn from past failures thereby preventing future
occurrences of the same problems. Examples of these mechanisms include the Challenger disaster. When the Space Shuttle
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Challenger exploded shortly after launch, it triggered a comprehensive investigation of NASA and its contractors. The
findings were documented in a public report of the causes of the disaster. As a result, the Shuttle’s solid rocket booster
underwent a complete redesign of the O-ring seals that secured the joints of the main sections of the booster. After nearly
one hundred launches since the disaster, there have been no recurrences of the problems associated with the former design
(Dombrowski, 1991).
NAT states that the accidents in high risk environments should be expected, and may even be considered “normal.” This is
due to the influence of tight coupling of activities and complexity of the system. Tight coupling exists when tasking
sequences are highly interdependent with little room for error. Complexity is reflected in the myriad of combinations of
outcomes of individual processes within the system, and the impact of those outcomes (Perrow, 1999). Sagan (1994) asserts
that the effects of political influence in such environments make the problem worse.
Proponents of NAT suggest that some factors that HRT advocates point to for increasing reliability, such as redundancy, can
actually reduce reliability. Specifically in the healthcare field, Tamuz and Harrison (2006) point out that overreliance on
social redundancy (e.g., double-checking medications) breeds complacency. Healthcare professionals become less vigilant
and rely on the “double-checker” to identify their mistakes. Over time, when no mistakes have been identified both
individuals become complacent, thereby increasing the probability of an undetected error.
Understanding how HRT and NAT relate to each other in high risk situations is valuable in that they identify organizational
factors that are desirable and those that are detrimental when it comes to reliability. However, in order to understand the
HRO, the relationships of the governing dynamics of the organization as a whole must be understood. This allows the
research team to identify not only the origins of emerging threats, but also their effects, and processes of remediation and
improvement. This risk Æ consequence Æ recovery Æ and growth cycle in the highest risk environments separates the HRO
from the traditionally less critical organization. Thus, a framework that illustrates the interrelatedness of the high reliability
environment is needed.
Tamuz and Harrison (2006) applied contributions from HRT and NAT in their study of patient safety in the health care
industry (Table 1).
HRT

NAT

Main concern

Improve reliability in high-hazard settings (e.g.,
airlines, nuclear power)

Raise awareness of unavoidable risk of major system
failures in industries using tightly coupled, interactively
complex technologies (e.g., nuclear power)

Orientation

Optimistic and melioristic; focuses on internal
organizational practices and culture

Pessimistic; focuses on industries and encourages
political elites to abandon or radically restructure
systems based on high risk technologies

Objectives

Reliability is first priority

Safety competes with other objectives

Redundancy

Technical
reliability

Structure and processes

Reliability enhanced by:
Rules and SOPs
Training in rule application
Decision making migrates toward expertise
Flexible structure enables rapid response

Assumptions

Applications

and

social

redundancies

HRO lacks discussion
interdependence

of

enhance

Redundancy can contribute to accidents when:
Lacks independence
Increases complexity
Obscures operating processes
Diffuses personal responsibility
Limited impact on rule enforcement and training
Decision making migrates toward the powerful
Key structural concepts include:
Interactive complexity
Tight and loose coupling

complexity

and

Interactive complexity and tight
potential for catastrophic failure

coupling

create

Cultural norms enhance reliability and safety

Safety culture is necessary but not sufficient for safety

Assumptions about risk

Managers assume that risk exists and that they can
devise strategies to cope with risk

Politics and
interpretation

Rewards

Rewards
behavior

Reward system influences and is influenced by politics

Culture

should

be

consistent

with

desired

personal
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HRT

NAT

Emphasizes cognition and developing a culture of
mindfulness
Top managers see the big picture
Individuals engage in valid and reliable sense
making

Limited treatment of cognition
Organizational conditions can distort or undermine
mindfulness
Barriers to top managers gathering information from
front lines
History of success undermines current vigilance

Table 1. A Comparison between the HRT and NAT Perspectives (adapted from Tamuz and Harrison, 2006).

They suggest that these two perspectives make contributions in five prominent safety practice areas in the healthcare setting:
•
•
•
•
•

double-checking medications (redundancy),
crew resource management (flexible hierarchical organizational structures),
computerized physician order entry (CPOE) (reduce systems complexity, increase tight coupling),
incident reporting (accountability without cultural “blame game”),
root cause analysis (value of organizational learning strategies).

HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS

Roberts and Bea (2001) suggest that some organizations have been very successful in their implementation of tightly-coupled
complex systems (e.g., those controlling nuclear power stations and chemical processes.). These organizations, by the very
nature of what they do require a high degree of reliability from their systems, procedures, and people. Roberts (1990)
identifies what it means to be a HRO by posing the question, "How often could this organization have failed with dramatic
consequences?" If failure could have occurred many thousands of times, but did not, the organization is considered highly
reliable. Another characteristic of HROs is that, "performance reliability rivals productivity as a dominant goal" (Roberts,
1990).
Sullivan and Beach (2004) suggest that it is the ability to balance capability and risk in the face of high consequence that
separate HROs from traditionally less critical organizations. The Sullivan-Beach Model (Figure 1) illustrates the dynamics
of managing complex systems in HROs using a scale to
Risk
Capability
represent the weight of risk and the required weight of
capability to counteract that risk. Failure occurs when risk,
comprised of expectations and risk factors, outweighs an
organization’s capability, comprised of resources and
Resources
Expectations
organizational competence. In such cases the scale tips out
of balance, and consequences follow such as those outlined
below.
Bilateral relationships in this model exist between
expectations and consequences, as well as expectations and
Risk Factors
Organizational
Competence
resources. Additionally, a one-way relationship between
consequences and organizational competence exists.
Expectations and consequences are related in that the
consequences for failure are consistent with the degree of
Reliability
missed expectations. For example, a delay in launching the
Consequences
space shuttle by one day violates an expectation that the
shuttle program stay on schedule.
However, the
consequences of failing to meet this expectation are minor.
Figure 1: Conceptual Model for How HROs Manage
Failing to meet the expectation of returning the shuttle and
Complex Systems.
its crew safely to earth involves severe consequences. The
relationship between expectations and resources is evident when stakeholders (government agencies, for example) provide
resources to a project. Certain expectations, or a return on investment, accompany those resource commitments. Conversely,
if resources are withdrawn, project managers will insist that stakeholders lower their expectations, or failure will result.
Similarly, if expectations increase, managers will demand additional resources. Finally, the one-way relationship between
consequences and organizational competence is best described as organizational learning. When HROs fail, an investigation
follows, and what is learned contributes to changes in policies and procedures that increase organizational competence so that
a particular type of failure does not occur again (ibid).
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HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS

Improving the reliability of healthcare systems would seem to be a natural objective in the healthcare industry. Placed in
terms of the model (Sullivan and Beach, 2004) the healthcare industry certainly is capability-intense with considerable risk
from many sources. In addition, there are high consequences for failure, particularly where patient safety is concerned.
There has been limited research surrounding the high reliability of healthcare systems. Much of the existing body of study
surrounds patient safety (Kaplan and Barach, 2002; Roberts et al., 2004; Sutcliffe et al., 2004; Roberts et al., 2005) and
medical errors (Koppel et al., 2005). Many studies that have addressed high reliability in healthcare have approached the
topic by drawing parallels between healthcare environments and HRO environments. The problem with this approach is that
there may be a considerable number of environmental variables that may unwittingly affect the research outcomes. In
particular, there may be influential factors among national healthcare system funding models that would need to be identified
in order to focus on those variables that affect reliability. Therefore it is the opinion of this research team that an empirical
study of high reliability in healthcare systems is appropriate and necessary. For the purposes of this research, healthcare
system reliability in Canada and the United States will be compared and contrasted to identify generic factors that contribute
to reliability in healthcare systems as well as those that are specific to the particular funding models of each of the nations.
RESEARCH PROJECT DESIGN

Large scale health care systems are complex, with a broad range of interacting variables. It is recognized that the “system” is
not solely comprised of technological components, but by including the interaction of its people (i.e., support, health care
professionals, and users) may have a profound impact on reliability. Additionally, a second dimension to the research will be
added to take into account the type of funding model applied in each type of environment. Thus, Canadian and the United
States subjects will provide the empirical data for the research.
The model (Sullivan and Beach, 2004) will provide an appropriate framework from which to base the research, as it not only
provides a comprehensive illustration of the factors that contribute to reliability but also reflects the dynamic relationships
between those factors. Thus, it is believed that the Sullivan-Beach Model the most appropriate representation of high
reliability principles of any model known to exist. From these observations, research questions that will drive the research
include:
"What impact does the origins of funding have on the reliability of health care systems?"
"Do other factors such as national culture have an impact on reliability of health care systems?"
The proposed research plan will operationalize these questions through the development of an interview protocol based on
the five prominent safety practice areas outlined above.
Interviews with Health Care Professionals

The interview process will provide a method of extracting the experiences and observations of the participants involved in
developing these systems. While interviews provide limited breadth, they allow a high degree of depth and detail into this
area of research. This process will involve a small number of participants, approximately twenty interviewees. Interview
data will be processed in order to identify the emerging themes of the major issues that affect system related outcomes.
EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THIS RESEARCH

It is anticipated that this research will result in a better understanding of the relative effectiveness of different funding models
in healthcare in relation to the concepts surrounding HROs. The Canadian healthcare system uses a funding model where
taxpayer contributions fund the entire system. The United States healthcare system is funded by individual funds and
insurance resources that are acquired by the individual. It is also expected that any phenomena related to national culture, if
any, will be identified. While Canadian and the United States cultures share many similarities, there may be a potential for
operational differences in the two systems that have their roots in cultural differences.
This research attempts to develop a better understanding of generic high reliability principles. It is believed that the model
(Sullivan and Beach, 2004) is capable of reflecting generic principles of high reliability. Potential for additional
contributions exist in that there has been limited study in areas of high reliability across national cultures. Further, there has
been limited study in high reliability that resulted in recommendations for disparate healthcare environments.
RECOGNIZED LIMITATIONS
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The research team approaches this research with the understanding that it is an ambitious undertaking. Known challenges
include collecting a representative sample of participants from multiple organizations in different countries. Obtaining access
to more than fifty interviewees, conducting the interviews, transcribing and analyzing the data will be a labor intensive effort.
Another limitation of the research is that there have been no known studies of the affects of national culture on reliability.
Thus it will be necessary to isolate factors that contribute to reliability from those that define each culture, yet be open to the
possibility that some factors may exist that contribute to both.
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